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From Crisis to Reform
Georges de Menil and Eytan Sheshinski
13.1 Introduction
Romania, a country of 23 million people strategically located at the
mouth of the Danube, is the largest country in Southeastern Europe.
When communism collapsed in Europe, the leadership of the Romanian
Communist Party ousted the dictator Nicolae Ceausescu in a bloody coup,
and set the country on a course of slow transition to the market. In No-
vember 1996, a coalition of democratic parties defeated the reformed com-
munists in legislative and presidential elections and launched a new pro-
gram of radical reforms. Pension reform become a key feature of this
program.
This paper describes pension reform in Romania. Sections 13.2 through
13.3 review the prereform situation, focusing on initial economic and dem-
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401ographic conditions and on the characteristics of the social security system
in 1996. Section 13.4 describes the political economy of the process. Sec-
tions 13.5 through 13.7 sketch the architecture of the new public and pri-
vate systems. Sections 13.8, 13.9, and 13.10 analyze the budgetary, eco-
nomic, and ﬁnancial eﬀects of transition to the new system. Section
13.11 concludes.
13.2 Initial Conditions: The Economy
Economically, Romania lies near the poorest end of the spectrum of the
transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In
1998, its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita ($1,696) was well below
that of the Czech Republic ($5,479) and of Hungary ($4,694), and close
to that of Russia ($1,882). Oﬃcial output was still 25 percent below the
level of that during the last communist year; its declines in the ﬁrst post-
communist years had not yet been erased by a sustained period of recov-
ery, as they had in Poland and Hungary. On the other hand, output had
not dropped as far (40 percent) as it had in Russia (see Vienna Institute for
International Economic Studies [WIIW] 2000). In its level of cumulative
liberalization since the end of communism, Romania was substantially be-
hind Poland and the Czech Republic.
13.3 Initial Conditions: The Pension System
The public pension system Romania inherited from the Ceausescu re-
gime was a loose collection of separate systems for the main industrial
workforce, farmers, artisans and craftsmen, church oﬃcials, and other cat-
egories. The principal pensions, those of former industrial workers, were
ﬁnanced by social security contributions that formally passed through a
social insurance fund to the budget. The provisions of the system as it
existed in 1989 were unsustainable. To survive the transition to a decen-
tralized (even if only slightly privatized) economy, the social security sys-
tem inherited from Ceausescu would have required radical consolidation
and a comprehensive tightening of the rules.
The successive governments between 1990 and 1996 chose to go in ex-
actly the opposite direction, increasing the number of beneﬁciaries and
multiplying special retirement provisions. At the same time, a general mi-
gration from the formal to the informal economy—to which social secu-
rity taxation contributed, but of which it was not the only cause—melted
away the contributor base.
Sections 13.3.3 and 13.3.4 summarize the way in which a decade of
unsustainable relaxation of beneﬁt criteria and of growing tax evasion left
the public pension system in deep crisis as the century closed. We begin,
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vious regime (section 13.3.1) and of subsequent demographic and eco-
nomic trends (section 13.3.2), both of which were unfavorable.
13.3.1 The Pension Legacy of the Ceausescu Regime
In 1989, 3.5 times as many contributors as beneﬁciaries were covered
by the basic state pension system. The balance would have seemed able to
support a reasonable pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system; however, two fatal
ﬂaws rendered the system unviable: The beneﬁt formulas were too gener-
ous, and the state provided pensions to many retirees outside the system,
who made no contributions.
Beneﬁt Formulas
The rules regulating the regime’s pension system, many of which had
been enacted in 1977, provided that a new retiree was entitled to a pension
equal to about 75 percent of the average wage earned in the ﬁve best con-
secutive of the previous ten years. This implied a replacement ratio of
about 65 percent, possibly higher. With a ratio of contributors to beneﬁ-
ciaries of 3.5, such a generous replacement ratio would have required a so-
cial security tax of 18.6 percent; the actual tax was 14 percent. Clearly, an
adjustment was needed.
Another imbalance characterized a supplementary pension scheme,
which had been operating since 1968. Whereas contributions to the basic
pension scheme were paid by employers, contributions to the supplemen-
tary scheme were paid entirely by employees. The contribution rate was 3
percent. The problem was that this entitled the worker to a supplementary
pension of 8 percent of the average of the ﬁve best of the previous ten
years’ wages, after he or she had worked ﬁve years. The addition to the
replacement rate increased to 16 percent after twenty-ﬁve years of work.
Given the ratio of contributors to beneﬁciaries, the additional contribution
rate required for balance at maturity was 4.6 percent.
During the introductory years of this system, while workers were mak-
ing contributions but not receiving beneﬁts, the system was obviously in
surplus. However, the parameters were such that once it reached full matu-
rity, it would have been sustainable only with a contribution-beneﬁciary
ratio of 5. 3. Again, something had to give.
Uncovered Beneﬁciaries: Farmers and Others
The largest category of uncovered beneﬁciaries was farmers, many of
whom were employees of cooperative farms. The cooperatives were dis-
solved in 1990. Two years later, the farmers’ contributions to their special
pension system became optional; only a small portion of them (approxi-
mately 80,000 in 1999—less than 5 percent of potential contributors)
agreed to pay the 7 percent contribution rate. To cover the farmers’ pen-
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involved with food and agricultural products.
In summary, the average replacement ratio implied by the written and
implicit rules of the Ceausescu pension system was many times the average
contribution rate. The ratio of the former to the latter far exceeded the
adjusted real ratio of contributors to beneﬁciaries. Had the Ceausescu
pension system not, in fact, been run by a state that commanded the entire
economy, it would have collapsed.
13.3.2 Demographic and Economic Fundamentals
Adverse demographic developments made a relatively modest contribu-
tion to Romania’s pension squeeze during the 1990s. The population above
the age of sixty did increase by 14 percent from the beginning to the end
of the decade as well-populated cohorts aged. The prime working-age pop-
ulation (ﬁfteen to sixty years), however, remained stable at about 14.1
million.1
Declining output and an even greater reduction of real wages—which
were half their 1990 levels by the end of the decade—did reduce the poten-
tial base in the real economy for the funding of a PAYGO system. How-
ever, distortions attributable to the system itself were the greatest contribu-
tors to its increasing imbalances.
13.3.3 System Eﬀects: A Growing Number of Beneﬁciaries
Throughout the region, there was a tendency for both postcommunist
and reformed communist administrations to undermine the solvency of
the PAYGO systems they inherited from the Soviet period. In order to
solidify popular support, they tended to grant liberal advantages to special
interest groups; common among these were special early retirement ar-
rangements and other pension provisions. In Romania, this granting of
privileges and exemptions led to a rate of increase in the number of retirees
far higher than that observed in any other country in Eastern Europe (see
Rutkowski 1999, ﬁg. 1). Average beneﬁts per retiree were also ratcheted
up at sensitive moments, even if they would subsequently be allowed to
become eroded by inﬂation.
The ﬁrst big increase in entitlements came within months of the fall of
Ceausescu, when ﬁve years of early retirement with full pensions were
granted to individuals who had worked longer than thirty years (for men)
or twenty-ﬁve years (for women). This provision caused the number of
retirees with full beneﬁts to jump by almost 400,000 persons, from 1.068
1. Ceausescu’s promotion of population growth (abortion was outlawed in 1967) did not,
as might have been expected, result in an increase of the prime working-age population in
the 1990s. Many of the additional young people born in the 1970s and 1980s appear either
to have died or to have emigrated right after the fall of the regime. See National Commission
of Statistics (various years).
404 Georges de Menil and Eytan Sheshinskimillion at the end of 1990 to 1.423 million at the end of 1991. (This in-
crease accounts for most of the increase in the total number of pensioners
of all categories, which is reported in table 13.1.) Because both numbers
are year-end ﬁgures, it can be fairly said that the immediate eﬀect of the
decree was to create a one-year ﬂow of new entrants into retirement equal
to half of the existing stock.
Eligibility for early retirement was subsequently extended for workers in
“hardship” categories. Workers in “diﬃcult” and “very diﬃcult” occupa-
tions (working groups II and I) could reduce their ages of retirement with
full beneﬁts to ﬁfty-ﬁve years for men and ﬁfty for women (group II) and
to ﬁfty years for men and forty-ﬁve for women (group I). The deﬁnition of
hardship was lax. At the end of 1989, the number of employees in working
groups I and II was about 300,000; by the end of 1992, this number has
risen to 3 million (see Ministry of Labor and Social Reform 1993). These
and other relaxations of retirement criteria caused the total stock of retir-
ees in all categories under the state system (not including farmers and
some other categories) to rise to 3.9 million by 1998, an increase of sixty-
ﬁve percent over the 1990 level.
13.3.4 System Eﬀects: The Collapse of the Number of Contributors
The decade was also marked by a dramatic decline in the number of
contributors to the state pension system. (See table 13.1.) Between 1990
and 1998, the number of contributors fell by almost 3 million. Of this
number, 1 million2 (about one-third of the decrease) corresponded to a sig-
niﬁcant rise in unemployment. By the end of 1998, the unemployed con-
stituted 10 percent of the number of active persons. Under the prereform
system in Romania, unemployed persons did not make social security
contributions. Each additional unemployed person reduced the contribu-
tor base—a classic example of the way in which unemployment strains a
social security system.
The increase in unemployment was not the only source of contributor-
base erosion during the decade. The number of active persons dropped
by 1 million, although the working-age population (aged ﬁfteen to sixty)
remained constant. The implication is that the number of inactive persons
grew by about 1 million. Furthermore, the number of employed persons
who were not wage earners (farmers, other self-employed, part-time work-
ers, etc.) grew by about 1 million to a total of 3,612,000 in 1998—this, at
a time when the farming population is known to have remained stable.
Thus, a total of about 2 million persons—twice as many as the number
unemployed by the transition—moved out of active labor market status
2. These data are for the registered unemployed, many of whom continue to be employed.
Unemployment by International Labor Organization (ILO) measures is three-fourths of
this number.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.and wage reporting jobs during this period. Many of these probably went
into the informal economy. Relative to the original contributor base
(8,156,000 wage earners in 1990) this represents a decline of 24 percent.
The loss of the contributor base to unemployment corresponds to an addi-
tional decline of 13 percent. The total reduction of the contributor base
w a st h u s3 7p e r c e n t .
Explanations for the erosion of the oﬃcial contribution-paying work-
force are not diﬃcult to ﬁnd. There were both a demand and a supply
for tax evasion. On the side of demand, the incentive not to declare was
substantial: Taxes on wages increased dramatically throughout this de-
cade. By 1999, the total tax rate for the top income bracket—which began
at the equivalent of $500 per month—was 118 percent: 58 percent for var-
ious social contributions, and 60 percent for the wage tax.
At the same time, the declining enforcement capacity of the state in
many areas generated an increasing number of opportunities to evade
taxes. The demise of the command economy, decentralization, and the
relatively more rapid growth of private wages than civil service wages all
combined to produce opportunities for bribes, and to reduce the eﬀec-
tiveness of tax collection in general.
Whatever the explanation, a loss of 37 percent of the contributor base,
combined with a 65 percent increase in the number of beneﬁciaries, inevi-
tably magniﬁed the imbalance of the system.
13.3.5 The Resulting Imbalance
The unsustainability of the Ceausescu pension system was not immedi-
ately apparent because beneﬁts were paid directly from the state budget.
As we have seen, some of the ﬁrst actions of the new government went in
the direction of widening it.
From 1990 to 1992, the government responded to the growing imbal-
ances in the system by progressively raising the basic tax rate for social
security contributions from 14.0 percent to 25.5 percent, an increase of 82
percent, in a little over two years. The resulting increase in revenues col-
lected was surprisingly low: Real revenues actually fell by 8 percent in
1992. Nonpayment of taxes, particularly by large state enterprises, became
a common practice at that time.
For the remainder of the period, through 1996, inﬂation remained the
principal mechanism for controlling the growing imbalances in the system.
The commitment to replace the average wages of the best ﬁve of the previ-
ous ten years referred to the nominal value of those past wages. Inﬂation
reduced the real value of that commitment.
Pensions were not eradicated by inﬂation, as they were in Russia, where
they did not keep pace with prices at all. The government arbitrarily in-
creased existing nominal pensions each year. These operations were called
“indexations”, but they fell far short of compensating for price increases.
Romania’s Pension System: From Crisis to Reform 407The real value of wages similarly declined, but pensions were generally
adjusted to a lesser degree than wages, and, as a consequence, the replace-
ment ratio tended to decline, falling from a high of 45.2 in 1993 to a low
of 38.6 in 1996 (a drop of 15 percent).
In 1996, the Vacaroiu government partially released even the inﬂation
break. Government Decision 595/96 provided that the wage history of new
retirees would no longer be based on historical, nominal net wages, but
would be indexed to equivalent, current wages. This resulted in roughly a
20 percent increase in the pensions that would be due to all future new
retirees. The public pension system entered a period of terminal crisis at
that point; the basic system was constantly in deﬁcit from 1995 through
the end of the century.
The last attempt to balance the old system, in January 1999, was an in-
crease in the combined, basic-plus-supplementary tax rate, from 28.5 per-
cent to 37.5 percent. This time, an eﬀort had been made to enforce greater
compliance; nonetheless, real revenues rose by only 4 percent. Fortunately,
a complete overhaul of the Romanian pension system was, at that point,
underway.
13.4 The Political Economy of Pension Reform
The fact that Romania did not join the ﬁrst wave of rapid reformers in
Eastern Europe between 1990 and 1992 had long-lasting implications for
the country.
Romania lost the potential beneﬁt of a period of “exceptional politics,”
such as Balcerowicz (1994) has described, in which the society was pre-
pared to accept a broad program of democratization and liberalization.
Instead it followed during the ﬁrst seven years, a self-styled gradualist
strategy, and postponed many major structural changes. Three successive
International Monetary Fund (IMF) standby agreements were signed and
shortly thereafter broken. The cumulative pressure of the resulting imbal-
ances eventually bred conditions of crisis in which reform became inevi-
table. It was thus that in the time leading up to the elections of November
1996, an incipient budgetary and balance-of-payments crisis created the
conditions that made the newly elected democratic coalition government’s
program of liberalization, convertibility, and stabilization a necessity. Simi-
larly, the cumulative imbalances of the pension system also made compre-
hensive reform inevitable.
As the new prime minister, Victor Ciorbea, moved to free the exchange
rate and prices and to eliminate subsidies, the new minister of labor and
social protection, Alexandru Athanasiu, resumed work on a stalled public-
pension reform act designed to correct the major imbalances. The liberal-
ization and stabilization programs were imbedded in agreements with the
IMF for a new standby loan, and with the World Bank for a resumption
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suspended a year earlier). The World Bank made the approval and passage
of public pension reform a performance criterion for its revived private-
sector adjustment loan.
The upshot was that in Romania, proposals for a comprehensive reform
of the public system (the ﬁrst pillar) were the ﬁrst pension reform propos-
als to be approved by government and sent to Parliament (September
1998), and the ﬁrst to be passed by Parliament (December 1999). At the
initiative and insistence of Minister Athanasiu, a proposal for the creation
of a mandatory system of private, funded pensions (the second pillar) was
submitted to Parliament in January 1999, four months after submission of
the ﬁrst-pillar law. Political conﬂict led to procedural delays, and it took
eighteen months for the draft law to clear the budgetary and labor commis-
sions of the Chamber of Deputies (June 2000). By then, the governing
coalition had weathered the second of two internal crises that marked its
term, a new government had been formed, and legislative elections were
ﬁve months away (November 2000). The new prime minister, Mugar Isare-
scu (previously the governor of the central bank) and the new minister of
labor, Smaranda Dobrescu, were both forceful advocates of a fully funded
and privately managed second pillar. The prime minister had supported
the project as central-bank governor, because it promised to raise domestic
saving and to redress the growing imbalance between dependent beneﬁ-
ciaries and working contributors. Minister Dobrescu was committed to
the project as a ﬁscally responsible, medium-term answer to the impover-
ished state of pensioners. Together they tried to accelerate the legislative
process. The prime minister submitted the draft law for review to the Eco-
nomic and Social Commission, a consultative body with important union
and employer representation. After intensive but rapid deliberations, the
commission approved the project, and the government promulgated the
law (modiﬁed to take account of some of the observations of the commis-
sion) as an emergency ordinance.3 The government’s expectation was that
the consensual nature of the project would permit the new legislature—
which, by necessity, would have to approve or modify the ordinance—to
deliberate more eﬃciently and rapidly.
In point of fact, the new government that formed after the elections in
December 2000 included second-pillar reform as a legislative priority in
the program, on the basis of which it obtained parliamentary conﬁrma-
tion. It nonetheless cancelled the emergency ordinance, and mandated a
new special commission to review pension reform strategy. Legislation has
also been drafted to regulate voluntary private pension funds (the third
pillar) and is awaiting consideration by the government.
3. By then, Minister Dobrescu had left the government and been replaced by Lucian Albu,
an economist, who was also a strong advocate of the project.
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one from an economic point of view. When there is a threat of insolvency
of the public system, the overriding economic priority is to rationalize it
in order to avoid the crisis. Moreover, if the eventual intention is to create
a mixed system, reform of the ﬁrst pillar can, through the savings it pro-
duces, wholly or partly ﬁnance the revenue shortfall associated with the
introduction of the second pillar. Finally, if private pension funds are
initially almost nonexistent (as in the case of Romania), their regulation,
although important, can wait for completion of reform of the ﬁrst two
pillars.
Politically, however, the order in which these three related reforms are
being addressed in Romania involves placing the most unpopular mea-
sures ﬁrst, and the least controversial, last.
13.5 The Reformed Public System
The new public law passed by Parliament in December 1999, after more
than a year of debate, reﬂects major substantive changes.4 Political com-
promises had to be made in some areas to achieve passage. The law puts
a halt to the most egregiously unsound practices of the prereform system,
and moderately tightens others. Some of the improvements in ﬁnancial
sustainability will take the form of additional revenue; others, of reduced
expenditure.
Most of the previous special regimes—notably, that pertaining to farm-
ers—are integrated into the basic social security system. Two million self-
employed persons, including farmers, are required to join the basic system.
The biggest eﬀect of this change is on the revenue side. The self-employed
are required to declare their incomes, and to make social security contribu-
tions at the standard employer-plus-employee rate (35 percent) for normal
categories of work. The income declared by a self-employed person cannot
be less than 25 percent of the economy-wide average wage. If the self-
employed declare, on average, 50 percent of the economy-wide wage, the
potential increase in contributors is equivalent to an additional 1 million
wage earners at the average wage.
Beneﬁts are no longer an entitlement divorced from contributions. A
new point system—modeled on the German system—replaces the old,
open-ended beneﬁt formulas. Workers accumulate points for each full year
worked at the average economy-wide wage.5 At retirement, the value of
4. The description that follows corresponds to the law that was passed in December 1999,
and does not take into account subsequent modiﬁcations.
5. The system has a built-in ceiling. A worker may not accumulate more than 3 points per
year, no matter how high his or her wage is. Contributors are similarly capped above three
times the average wage.
410 Georges de Menil and Eytan Sheshinskithe new retiree’s points is determined according to a formula that ensures
that a worker who has worked a standard full term of years at the average
wage will receive a pension equal to 45 percent of the going average gross
wage in the year of his or her retirement.6
The point system eliminates the excesses of the previous formula, which
was based on the best, recent ﬁve-year average. It also replaces the ﬁnan-
cially unsound provisions of the prereform supplementary pension system,
which is merged into the general system and, by and large, disappears as
a separate calculation.
Expenditures will also be reduced by phased increases in the retirement
a g ea n dar e s t r i c t i o no ft h ec o n d i t i o n su n d e rw h i c haw o r k e ri se n t i t l e dt o
early retirement at full pension. In both areas, the ﬁnal legislation reﬂects
compromises between the government’s more stringent proposals and par-
liamentary pressure to retain former privileges. The legal retirement age
(sixty-two for men and ﬁfty-seven for women in the prereform system) is
raised by small increments over the course of thirteen years to sixty-ﬁve
for men and sixty for women.7 Furthermore, provisions for early retirement
with full pension are moderately tightened, but continue to depend on the
presumed diﬃculty of working conditions. The new law limits the right of
workers in normal working conditions and in conditions of “particular
diﬃculty” to retire early with full pension. The principal diﬀerence be-
tween the old and the new law is that there is a large reclassiﬁcation of
jobs, intended to reduce the proportion of workers in “special diﬃculty”
and “particular diﬃculty” jobs.8 The combined eﬀect of these changes will
reduce the minimum retirement age for new retirees by two years.
Provisions for invalidity beneﬁts are also made moderately more rigor-
ous. Beneﬁciaries of pensions for persons who are unable to work but who
can take care of themselves—a category whose numbers had swollen in
the previous decade—are required to be examined every six or twelve
months, with a possible view to discontinuation.
The new law also created a new, public, autonomous body to collect
contributions and distribute pensions. This is the National House of Social
Insurance, a body governed by a board with representatives from unions,
employer associations, retiree associations, and government, and run by a
president appointed to a seven-year term by the prime minister. This
eﬀectively makes the social partners coresponsible with government for
the operation of the public pension system.
6. When the system is mature, a standard work history will be thirty-ﬁve years for men
and thirty for women.
7. The minimum work history required for full pension is also raised in increments, from
twenty-ﬁve and thirty years (for women and men, respectively) to thirty and thirty-ﬁve years.
8. Many jobs in heavy industry—notably, steel making and metallurgy—are reclassiﬁed
from the most diﬃcult category to the intermediate category.
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Four months after the new public law was introduced in Parliament, the
government introduced a second pension law, the purpose of which is to
establish a new mandatory system of private, individual pension accounts.9
The Universal Pension Fund Law mandates that 10 percent of every work-
er’s wage—roughly one-third of the average social security contribution—
be reallocated to a personal account in the worker’s name in a privately
managed Universal Pension Fund. The worker’s total contribution remains
the same, but a portion of it is diverted to his or her personal account. The
principal entity in the proposed system is the Universal Pension Fund, a
civil company to which individuals adhere as members. It cannot have
proﬁts, declare bankruptcy, or otherwise act as a commercial entity. The
purpose of the fund is to invest its members’ contributions collectively,
distributing all proﬁts back to participants.
The law stipulates that each fund will contract a proﬁt-making commer-
cial entity—the Universal Pension Fund management company (fund
manager)—which will invest the pension fund’s assets and will derive a
proﬁt from this activity. In order to assure continuity and stability, the re-
lationship between a fund and a fund manager will not be terminated on
short notice. Thus the law provides for a close relationship between the
Universal Pension Fund and the fund manager. The fund manager’s in-
vestments are subject to close regulation and supervision by a special
agency (below).
The fund manager will not actually hold the assets of participants. In-
stead, participants will have contracts with specially licensed depositories
that will keep custody of the assets and serve as additional guarantees of
securities. Depositories will have the legal duty to report immediately all
transactions to the pension regulator. Although the fund manager and the
Universal Pension Fund may have a signiﬁcant link between themselves,
the depository will be allowed no ﬁnancial links with either.
The funds are based on a deﬁned contribution (DC) principle. Thus,
each member will have an account. The assets accumulated consist of
mandatory contributions and of investment income attributable to those
contributions. Participants select their initial preferred pension funds and
may later switch, with some limitations, to other funds. This potential mo-
bility and competition for members among funds is regarded as a major
disciplinary measure. Because of the DC nature of the funds, no particular
annual rate of return is guaranteed. However, the government assures that
over the course of a lifetime of saving, participants will be provided upon
9. This section describes the provisions of the law as it was originally submitted to Parlia-
ment. Some provisions were changed in the emergency ordinance, but the structure remained
essentially as it had been originally proposed.
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real rate of return). We discuss below in some detail the possible eﬀects of
this guarantee, and compare it with other forms of guarantees in diﬀerent
countries.
Upon retirement, the participant will deposit his or her accumulated
saving in a licensed annuity company, which will convert the saving into
annually paid retirement beneﬁts. The speciﬁc terms of these (indexed)
annuities will be determined by the regulator. Because the reform is de-
signed to produce in one decade the ﬁrst retirees who will receive beneﬁts
from their contributions to private funds, there is time to reﬁne the neces-
sary regulatory framework for annuity companies.
13.6.1 Identifying the Risks of Universal Pension Funds
The risks of privately managed DC pension funds can be classiﬁed as
(1) portfolio and investment risk, (2) agency risk, and (3) systemic risk.10
Portfolio risk contains unsystematic or diversiﬁable risk and systematic
or market risk. Rules pertaining to portfolio diversiﬁcation should reduce
the unsystematic risk and, to a lesser extent, the market risk (by diversiﬁ-
cation into other markets, including foreign ones). The principal objective
of regulation is to ensure that some very risky and illiquid assets are elimi-
nated from the range of eligible investment. The exposure to market risk
(i.e., business cycles, episodes of asset price ﬂuctuations, and inﬂation) can
also be reduced by proper diversiﬁcation, including investments in foreign
markets; but some risk does remain.
Agency risk occurs when the interests of fund administrators and asset
managers are not fully aligned with the interest of fund members. Asym-
metric information between fund managers and fund members with regard
to portfolio strategies as well as the low levels of ﬁnancial sophistication
of these members may lead to ineﬃciency and abuse. These risks depend
in good part, as Rocha, Gutierrez, and Hinz (1999) point out, on the legal
and governance structures of the pension funds.
In addition to the obvious risks of misfeasance, malfeasance, and theft
of assets, there are more intricate risks of investments that reduce the re-
turn to members: investment in related companies, directed fee arrange-
ments, kickbacks, and inﬂated overhead changes, for example. Transpar-
ency is a problem because of the multiplicity of fees, netting against
investment returns, or bundling with other services.
Concerning systemic risks, although pension funds (unlike banks) do
not confront short-term liquidity problems (such as runs on banks), they
may be aﬀected by a banking crisis that leads to a collapse of asset prices
and the insolvency of some banks. There may also be negative spillovers
from the insurance industry.
10. See Rocha, Gutierrez, and Hinz (1999).
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A Pension Control Commission will be established as an autonomous
public institution, the purpose of which will be to grant and withdraw
authorizations and licenses (see below) and issue investment regulations.
It will work in conjunction with the National Bank of Romania (BNR),
the stock market supervision authority (CNVM), the insurance supervi-
sor, and the National House of Social Insurance (the ﬁrst pillar). The es-
tablishment of a new autonomous pension authority, instead of an enlarge-
ment of the supervisory jurisdiction of the above institutions to cover
private pension funds, was preferred because of the unique aspects of these
funds (e.g., long-term investments and annuitization) and the apparent
weaknesses of some existing regulatory agencies.
The president of Romania shall appoint the chairman of the Pension
Control Commission to a seven-year renewable term. Strict provisions en-
sure the independence of the chairman, and removal from oﬃce is re-
stricted to extreme cases of dereliction of duty.
An important role of the Pension Control Commission is the monitoring
and inspection of the funds, including review of ﬁnancial reports and on-
site reviews. Supervisors are required to monitor portfolio composition
and other structural requirements in real time, and to provide ﬁnancial
data to members. The Pension Control Commission has authority to im-
pose remedial and punitive sanctions, remove fund managers, and im-
pose ﬁnes.
13.7 The Regulation of Private Pension Funds
The regulation of the private pension funds aims to ensure the security,
stability, cost minimization, transparency, and sound investment decisions
of these funds. Because pension funds typically are concerned with a larger
portion of lower-income groups than are other ﬁnancial institutions, a ma-
jor crisis may lead to the creation of pockets of poverty among the elderly
and to a demand for support and intervention by the government. This
explains the motivation for tight prudential regulations and supervision of
these funds.
The main components of the regulation of universal pension funds by
the supervisory authority, as set in the law, are the following (see also Ro-
cha, Gutierrez, and Hinz 1999):
● Licensing (authorization) criteria
● Governance rules
● Independent custodianship rules
● Disclosure requirements
● External audit/actuary requirements
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● Guarantees
● Minimum capital and reserve requirements
● Regulations on costs and fees
Licensing (authorization) Criteria
The Pension Control Commission will grant and withdraw licenses for
pension funds and fund managers. Regulations focus on the capital and
professional credentials of the management company (which includes the
professional standing of the parent bank or insurance company). Exten-
sive capital and reserve requirements are imposed in order to limit entry to
a relatively small number of entities, making in-depth oversight practical.
Governance Rules
Each pension management company must be exclusively dedicated to
the management of one pension fund; it cannot delegate or subcontract its
management functions. The quality of governance is addressed by rules on
self-dealing, conﬂicts of interest, and the responsibilities and credentials of
board members.
Independent Custodianship Rules
The independent depositary for assets described above are aimed at lim-
iting agency risks. The fund manager does not directly hold legal title to
the assets of the pension fund, limiting the opportunity for fraud.
Disclosure Requirements
These rules include methods of asset valuations (mark to market), the
frequency of those valuations, and the distribution of information to fund
members and to the general public. Thus, account statements are made
available to members every quarter, and the Pension Control Commission
will publish extensive and detailed information on the industry. Regulators
have wide authority to verify the accuracy of ﬁnancial statements issued
by pension funds. Disclosure requirements enable participants to make
informed choices and place competitive pressure on fund managers, al-
though some argue that switching across funds in other countries was
driven mainly by marketing eﬀorts (Vittas 1998).
External Audit/Actuary Requirements
Auditors are required to report any problem to the control commission
and are legally liable for failure to do so.
Investment Regulations
These rules aim at minimizing portfolio risks and, to an extent, market
and agency risks. The law stipulates ceilings on the holding of several lim-
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listed shares in Romania, and to a lesser extent, bonds and shares listed in
major stock exchanges around the world. Regulations also place ceilings
on holdings by the issuer, thereby disallowing a controlling interest by any
pension fund.
Restrictions imposed on pension fund investments in certain asset
classes have generated controversy. Some Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries do not impose restric-
tions by asset class and follow the “prudent-person” rule, which requires
that investment decisions be diligent and satisfy the goal of risk diver-
siﬁcation. Rocha, Gutierrez, and Hinz (1999) cite evidence that real re-
turns of pension funds in prudent-person environments were higher than
those of funds operating under quantitative restrictions on asset classes.
The similarity of investment portfolios of pension funds in Chile, which
restrict member choice, was cited by Feldstein as one reason for their
high costs.
It seems, however, that tight quantitative investment restrictions in Ro-
mania—a transition economy with underdeveloped markets and regula-
tory structures—are justiﬁed, at least initially. The quantitative approach
(termed “draconian” by some) is simple, easy to police, and greatly re-
duces uncertainty for all parties. These restrictions can be relaxed over
time as markets and the legal framework improve.
The same argument applies to the rule against multiple portfolios. Al-
though a single portfolio signiﬁcantly reduces the degree of choice among
the risk-return combinations, which typically diﬀer across age groups, the
additional costs associated with multiple portfolios seem to outweigh the
beneﬁts in countries such as Romania, the bulk of whose citizens cannot
be expected to make informed decisions on the compositions of their port-
folios.
Guarantees
Like some other countries that have introduced a second mandatory
pillar, Romania oﬀers participants a zero real rate of return on their contri-
butions. This is similar to Hungary (which oﬀered a zero real rate of return
to workers below the age of forty and a 4 percent real rate of return for
other workers) or to Switzerland (which guarantees a 4 percent nominal—
about a 2 percent real—rate of return). This guarantee is backed by re-
quired minimum reserves and equity imposed on the pension manager and
by a central guarantee fund. In case of insolvency of the manager and the
central guarantee fund, there is an explicit guarantee from the govern-
ment budget.
The provision of guarantees raises two basic questions. First, what is
the probability that the guarantee will be called, and is the capital backing
adequate for this purpose? Second, to what extent does the guarantee in-
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investment decisions)?
In Latin America and Central Europe, most countries have provided
guarantees in the form of annual minimum returns, expressed in relative
terms. Thus, a minimum return is deﬁned relative to the average return of
all pension funds, or relative to a broader market benchmark. The bench-
mark is expressed in either real or nominal terms. In Chile, for example,
each fund must achieve a minimum return equal to 50 percent of the aver-
age real rate of return of the industry. In Argentina, funds must achieve
70 percent of the average nominal return of the industry (Vittas 1998).
These relative guarantees attempt to deal primarily with ineﬃcient (or
fraudulent) fund managers. They induce, however, a visible moral hazard
in the form of a “herding” eﬀect. That is, portfolios tend to cluster around
the portfolios of the large and leading funds. As a result, the choices avail-
able to members are further limited (in addition to the limits imposed by
ceilings on asset classes).
A related moral hazard concerns the extent to which private capital is
put at risk in relation to the guarantees. If the assets of the fund manager
(or the parent company) are not aﬀected before the government guarantee
is called, a negative agency risk is introduced. Although calculations indi-
cate that this is not a serious problem (see below), it is an issue on which
Romanian law may have to be modiﬁed.
Absolute guarantees, such as in Romania (or Switzerland and Hungary),
deﬁned as a minimum return over the working lifetime of members, intro-
duce a measure of intergenerational pooling similar to that found in deﬁned
beneﬁt (DB) systems. This seems to be a major advantage of the Roma-
nian system.
The guarantee of a zero real return is based on detailed calculations and
simulations. Baseline calculations assume an 8 or 10 percent contribution
rate to the second pillar. With a zero-return benchmark, annuity beneﬁts
as percent of GDP will rise from 0.03 percent in 2025 to 0.77 percent in
2040 for an 8 percent contribution rate; and from 0.04 percent to 0.96
percent for a 10 percent contribution rate. To evaluate the risks entailed
by the guarantees, calculations have used time series data on equity and
bond returns in France from 1870 to 1998. Obviously, application of
French time series to a transition economy such as Romania’s requires
caution. Emerging economies are considered to have higher risks and
higher expected returns than mature economies. For cumulative processes
over long periods, such as lifetime investment returns, the higher returns
can be expected to dominate the higher short-term risks. Thus, we believe
that our calculations are, on the whole, conservative.
The average annual return on equities in France since 1870 has been 4.5
percent (standard error 14.6 percent). The average annual real return on
bonds since 1950 has been 2.1 percent (standard error 5.3 percent). Simu-
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return on equities over a twenty-year holding period is 91 percent, and
over a thirty-year period (approximately) 100 percent. The numbers for
bonds are similar.
Statistical tests show that the time series of returns on equities and
bonds are stationary and have zero serial correlation. Consequently, a large
number of samples have been constituted from random time series of re-
turns with the appropriate parameters. The simulations are based on a
50–50 portfolio of equities and bonds. The diﬀerence between each
sample’s outcome and the baseline (zero real return) provided the gains or
losses that must be covered according to the guarantees.
Figure 13.1 displays one such calculation of gains and losses as a per-
centage of GDP (in 1996). The heavy line (Hamayon 1998, 6) gives the
baseline of zero return.
Each line represents a diﬀerent possible growth scenario, reﬂecting suc-
cessive drawings from the underlying distribution of returns. It is seen that
an overwhelming number of runs (samples) exceed the baseline (i.e. the
guaranteed zero return). Figures 13.2 and 13.3 provide estimates of by-
passing the guaranteed threshold. They display a histogram of the excess
(shortage) over the guaranteed zero return, as a percentage of GDP (ﬁg.
13.2) or of the rate of return (ﬁg. 13.3), of sample returns. The right-hand
axis applies to the cumulative probability represented by the downward-
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Fig. 13.1 The variability of the growth of private pension funds as a percentage of
GDP (normal conditions)Fig. 13.2 Distribution of actualized gains and losses from 2025 to 2040 (10%
contributions to private funds)
Fig. 13.3 Distribution of generations’ actuarial yields of (10% contribution to
private funds)sloping line. Thus, with a 10 percent contribution rate, about 90 percent
of the 100 simulations yielded a positive return, and 50 percent of the
samples gave a return higher than 2.2 percent.
A more severe scenario has also been calculated. Discarding the zero
serial correlation assumption, returns from the year 2010 to 2020 have
been sampled from only the negative portion of the frequency of returns,
reﬂecting a market-crash scenario lasting for ten years. Under these cir-
cumstances there is a 25 percent chance that the guarantee will be called,
although it will be less than one percent of GDP (see ﬁgs. 13.4 and 13.5).
Based on these calculations, it seems reasonable that the central risk fund
will be adequate to back even extremely adverse circumstances.
Minimum Capital and Reserve Requirements
A signiﬁcant share capital (10 million euros) is required and may not be
encumbered. A portion of the share capital (5 million euros) must be kept
permanently in cash in Romania. Fund managers shall be required in ad-
dition to contribute to the National Guarantee Fund. These capital re-
quirements seem excessive. In DC funds, there is no rationale for holding
capital at these levels, and such a requirement imposes a signiﬁcant cost
that will be shifted to members. Presumably, the capital requirement has
been introduced as a screening device to reduce agency risks associated
with unreliable fund managers.
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Fig. 13.4 Eﬀects of ten-year crash (beginning in 2010) on distribution of
actualized gains and losses from 2025 to 2040 (10% of contributions)Regulations on Costs and Fees
Two types of commissions are allowed: a percentage of contributions
(front-load) or of the value of net assets. A ceiling (1.0 percent) has been
imposed on the latter type, whereas the former is expected to be set com-
petitively. The restrictions imposed, although they tend to cluster expenses
at the allowable maximum, were intended to protect relatively uninformed
members who are unable to evaluate alternative multidimensional pric-
ing schemes.
13.8 The Budgetary Implications of the Public and Private Reforms
13.8.1 The Saving Generated by First-Pillar Reform
A move from a PAYGO system to a funded system, whether partial or
complete, necessarily entails a transitional deﬁcit while existing liabilities
under the previous system are progressively paid oﬀ. How that deﬁcit is
ﬁnanced has a major inﬂuence on the economic eﬀect of the reform.
In the Romanian case, the principal source of ﬁnancing for the transi-
tional deﬁcit is expected to be saving from the reform of the public system.
We shall evaluate this source, then report projections of the net eﬀect on
the budget of public reform and private funding.
Our analysis begins with an estimate of the saving to be expected from
tightening the conditions for early retirement, tightening beneﬁt formulas,
and increasing the retirement age. We measure these in a succinct way by
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Fig. 13.5 Eﬀects of ten-year crash (beginning in 2010) on distribution of
generations’ actuarial yields (10% of contribution)comparing the present discounted value of the liabilities—to persons who
were alive in 1999—of the old and the new public system.
The computation adds up the expected lifetime payments to which per-
sons alive in 1999 were entitled at that point. It does not include future
entitlements that young persons in 1999 could have expected to accumu-
late during the remaining years of their working lives; nor does it include
the possible entitlements of future entrants to the workforce.11
Table 13.2 tells the basic story. In 1999, the total implicit liabilities of
the prereform public system, discounted at 5 percent, were 140 percent of
GDP. The total implicit liabilities of the reformed system, had it gone into
eﬀect in 2000, would have been 106 percent of GDP at the same discount
rate, or 24 percent less than the prereform liabilities.
It is worth noting that, because the reform does not alter the state’s
liabilities to existing retirees (who have already taken advantage of what-
ever formulas and provisions were available), the entire amount of those
savings must come from a reduction of liabilities to working people. One
can see from table 13.2 that the discounted total liabilities to working men
and women went from 67 percent of GDP to 38 percent of GDP. Tight-
ening reduced those liabilities by a factor of 43 percent.
The reform is also expected to increase the number of contributors pay-
ing social security taxes. One important source of the increase is the incor-
poration of an estimated 2 million farmers and other self-employed per-
sons into the basic system. If one assumes that the average new contributor
declares half of the average wage, the enlargement is equivalent to an in-
crease of 1 million contributors at the average wage, or 19 percent of the
5.2 million contributors in the system at the end of 1998. It is estimated
that it will take four years for these new contributors to integrate fully into
the system. Eventually, the new contributors also become new beneﬁcia-
ries; the fact that they enter ﬁrst as contributors implies that there is an
increase in the present discounted value of revenue into the system.
In addition, the combination of the ﬁrst- and second-pillar laws creates
strong incentives for compliance on the part of the population at large.
The ﬁrst-pillar law establishes a direct link, which previously did not exist,
between future pension beneﬁts and lifetime contributions. The second-
pillar law expands on this by treating social security tax payments and
contributions to each worker’s individual account symmetrically. If the tax
is not paid, the corresponding individual account is not credited. It is ex-
pected that a worker will feel a sense of ownership of his or her individual
11. To the extent that workers could be expected to continue accumulating entitlements
beyond 1999, the computation underestimates the total eﬀective liabilities of both systems.
What is important for our purposes is that we measure the implicit liabilities of the pre- and
postreform systems in a comparable matter. Simulations from 1999 forward with the Ha-
mayon, Legros (1998) model are used to estimate the implicit debt of the old and new sys-
tems. See de Menil, Hamayon, and Seitan (1999) for further details.




















































































































































































































































































































.account, and will therefore pressure his or her employer to pay on time. It
is reasonable to assume that these two changes together will, over time,
reduce evasion and further increase the ratio of the contributor base to the
active population. We estimate that Romania’s currently high evasion rate
will converge slowly to the European Union (EU) average, thus bringing
about a gradual increase in both the contributor base and the number
of beneﬁciaries.
13.8.2 Simulations of the Net Budgetary Implications
of the Combined Reforms
The replacement ratio for full pensions mandated by the new pension
law is 45 percent of the gross wage (which is high, but well below the
potential replacement rate, under conditions of full indexation, of the old
system). The equivalent average replacement ratio for all pensions is 35
percent (including survivors and disability). We have estimated that at the
end of 1999 the ratio of contributors to beneﬁciaries (including farmers)
was roughly 1. Under those conditions, a 35 percent (including farmers)
replacement ratio would require a 35 percent social security tax on net
wages. The actual eﬀective average tax at the end of 1999 was 34 percent.
The integration of the farmers and other self-employed persons should, in
a few years, bring the ratio of contributors to beneﬁciaries to 1.22. If one
adds to that measure the reduction in the number of beneﬁciaries through
early retirement that the tightening of retirement provisions is expected to
produce, as well as a reasonable reduction of the evasion rate, it seems
clear that the provisions of the new public law should, in time, produce
enough saving to ensure its medium-term sustainability on a stand-alone
basis.12 This begs the next question, however: Is the additional saving
enough, and is it realized quickly enough, to ﬁnance the introduction of
the second pillar? The answer to this question has been sought in a series
of simulations of combined ﬁrst- and second-pillar reform, under various
economic, demographic, and policy assumptions.
Model and Assumptions
The model used for these simulations is a medium-term model devel-
oped by Stephane Hamayon and the Quantix consulting ﬁrm (Hamayon
and Legros 1998), which focuses on the relationships between demo-
graphic trends and the rules and provisions of the public retirement sys-
tem. It approximates the age distribution of the working-age population
with density functions that can be projected many years forward, and
modiﬁed to take account of changes in the birth rate and life expectancy.
12. The increase in the earliest possible legal retirement age is expected temporarily to
freeze new entries into retirement. Even if this eﬀect is partially compensated by some retire-
ments in anticipation of the law, the eﬀective number of beneﬁciaries could fall by 100,000
in the ﬁrst two years. The reduction of evasion is likely to be modest, if ﬁrst-pillar reform is
not accompanied by second-pillar reform.
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law in eﬀect. The beneﬁt formulas of the law are used to relate retirement
beneﬁts to past wage histories. Economic production, the movement of
real wages, and the evolution of the evasion rate are exogenous inputs into
the model.13
The model is used to examine the short- and medium-term eﬀects of
joint implementation of the government’s public and private pension re-
forms, beginning in January 2001. The following economic and demo-
graphic assumptions are made: The life expectancy of men and women is
assumed to continue rising at a slow rate. The net reproduction rate is as-
sumedto reacha lowof 1.7.Real outputand realwages beginﬂat, andcon-
verge ata 4percent rate ofgrowth. Evasionconverges slowlyto West-Euro-
pean levels. Our focus will be on the resulting simulations of the growth
of the private pension funds, on the one hand, and the budget of the public
pension system, on the other.
The crucial policy parameters in these simulations are the provisions of
the reformed public system, the magnitude of the diversion to private
funds, and the nature of the phasing-in of this diversion. We examine the
implications of a switch to the new public law, as described above, and of
a 10 percent diversion, which is mandatory for all workers with more than
twenty years until retirement and optional for workers with ten to twenty
years until retirement. We assume that 35 percent of the workers given the
option choose the diversion.14
Table 13.3 documents the magnitude of the ﬂows into private pensions.
They begin in 2001 at 0.57 percent of GDP, and rise over twenty-ﬁve years
(as contributions progressively become mandatory for the entire work-
force) to 3.56 percent. Twelve years after the reform, the accumulated con-
tributions and compounded growth raise the total assets of these funds to
20 percent of GDP. Total assets eventually level oﬀ at 72 percent of GDP.
There is a modest transitional deﬁcit, but it ends, and becomes a surplus
after four years. It begins at 1.91 percent of GDP in the ﬁrst year and
diminishes progressively. In the ﬁrst year, it is greater than the amount of
the funds being diverted to private accounts. This is a reﬂection of the
unbalanced initial conditions prior to the reform, and the fact that the
saving introduced in the ﬁrst pillar materialize only progressively.15 The
saving continues beyond the point, in the fourth year, at which it entirely
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13. The simulations thus do not take account of potentially important feedbacks from the
reforms themselves to real economic evolutions. For a description of the model, see Ha-
mayon and Legros (1998).
14. Hungarian and Polish experiences suggest that this is a reasonable number.
15. In the ﬁrst instance, the provisions of the new law that reduce the number of new
retirees and limit their pensions aﬀect only marginally the total volume of payments to all
outstanding retirees. On the other hand, the provision that makes indexation of existing pen-
sions to the consumer price level mandatory immediately eliminates what had previously
been a constant annual source of erosion. On the revenue side, the integration of farmers
and other self-employed persons takes four years to become complete.pays for the diversion of contributions to the second pillar. Saving gener-
ates a positive surplus in the social security fund that lasts for the full ﬁfty
years of the simulation. It rises to 5 percent of GDP in the ﬁfteenth year
of the reform, and then slowly declines.
In summary, saving in the public pension law over time more than pays
for the diversion to private pensions. The saving does not become opera-
tive immediately, however. There is an initial three-year period during
which the budgetary costs of diversion to the private system are added to
the residual deﬁcit of the public system. These results are not very sensitive
to changes in demographic assumptions or to reasonable changes in the
speed of reduction of evasion. They are aﬀected signiﬁcantly by the rate
of growth, the rate of return, the magnitude of the draw-down to private
accounts, and the timing of its introduction.
13.9 The Economic Eﬀects of Pension Reform
13.9.1 Reduced Labor Market Distortions and Evasion
A major argument for a fully funded, mandatory pension system as a
second pillar for retirement income is that it will have a positive eﬀect on
eﬃciency and growth. This eﬀect can be achieved by a reduction in labor
Table 13.3 Accumulation of Private Pension Funds, and the Eﬀect on the Social
Security Budget of the Simultaneous Reform of the Public Pension
System and Introduction of Private Pension Funds
Net Flows Capitalization Surplus/Deﬁcit of
into of Social Security Budget
Date Private Funds Private Funds (% of GDP)
2001 0.57 0.57 1.91
2002 1.26 1.84 1.65
2003 1.41 3.25 0.87
2004 1.59 4.83 0.05
2005 1.74 6.55 0.74
2006 1.92 8.43 1.49
2007 2.11 10.50 2.29
2008 2.31 12.75 3.00
2009 2.46 15.15 3.59
2010 2.60 17.67 4.07
2015 3.03 31.47 5.02
2020 3.32 45.29 4.64
2030 3.56 68.11 3.95
2040 3.55 71.83 2.39
Source: Simulations with the Hamayon and Legros (1998) model.
Notes: Ten percent of wages allocated to personal accounts, participation mandatory for
workers with fewer than twenty years to retirement, optional for those with fewer than ten
years.
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ﬁned beneﬁts, and through an increase in the national saving rate and
the capital stock, and consequently in income per capita. Which of these
economic eﬀects can Romania’s joint ﬁrst- and second-pillar reforms be
expected to produce?
In the Romanian case, the labor market eﬀect is qualitatively diﬀerent
from what it is in other countries. The simulations in table 13.3 show that,
after four years, the 1999 reform of Romania’s public pension system more
than pays for the permanent diversion of 10 percent of wages to individual
private accounts. If existing workers view their contributions to private
accounts as beneﬁts rather than as taxes, the combination of the two re-
forms can be said to reduce the eﬀective tax on wages of existing contribu-
tors by 10 percent. We have shown above, however, that the Romanian
reforms include the integration of a substantial number of new contribu-
tors—largely farmers—who were previously paying very little tax. The net
result of the reforms from the point of view of taxes is that they equalize
the eﬀective tax on existing and new contributors at a 25 percent rate. The
average tax rate is unchanged, but a distortionary diﬀerence between the
t w oi sr e m o v e d . 16 There is presumably a gain in eﬃciency, but it is diﬃcult
to estimate, and is qualitatively diﬀerent from the eﬃciency gains of
across-the-board reductions in wage taxes estimated in other studies.
A further remark is in order. The simulation in table 13.3 shows that the
combined reforms produce a rising surplus in the public pension fund after
the third year. If that surplus were used to pay for an across-the-board
reduction in Romania’s very high social security taxes, additional eﬃ-
ciency gains would likely result.17
The simulation in table 13.3 assumes that the percentage of the popula-
tion covered by social security in Romania will increase from the current
63 percent to 90 percent, due to the introduction of the point system and
the creation of the private pension system. Clearly, funded DC plans are
less likely to be evaded because they closely link beneﬁts to contributions.
The magnitude of this eﬀect, however, is diﬃcult to estimate. If workers
are myopic (contrary to the preceding discussion), they may continue to
evade contributions because they will be unable to access their mandatory
saving for many years. When investment returns are low, workers may es-
16. Existing contributors, who were paying 35 percent on average before the two reforms,
perceive that their social security tax has been reduced to 25 percent. New contributors,
who were previously paying roughly zero, perceive that their social security taxes have been
increased to 25 percent (the new 35 percent contribution, minus the 10 percent diversion to
a private account).
17. Feldstein and Samwick (1996) have estimated that a 10.4 percentage point reduction
in the U.S. payroll tax increases steady state GDP by one percent annually. Kotlikoﬀ (1996)
ﬁnds that a similar reform leads to a 4 percent gain in consumption. Comparable tax reduc-
tions might be expected to lead to a greater decrease in dead-weight loss in Romania, because
of its higher eﬀective tax rates.
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housing or durables. On the other hand, the relatively low coverage rate in
Romania is, at least in part, due to legal avoidance rather than evasion.
(The use of civil contracts is an example.) This is why we think the Ha-
mayon estimates are realistic.
13.9.2 Augmented Retirement Age
Another source of ineﬃciency of PAYGO, DB systems is that political
considerations (particularly during periods of unemployment) lead to ex-
cessively early retirement ages with generous beneﬁts (high replacement
rates). One can expect that fully funded DC plans will mitigate this eﬀect,
because if the worker retires early the costs are internalized via a reduced
pension. Thus, for example, if Romania’s reforms eventually lead workers
to raise their retirement ages by at least four years, and if leisure is worth,
on average, half the wage during that period, then the supply of labor and
GDP (assuming constant marginal productivity of labor) are both raised
by almost 10 percent and welfare by 5 percent.
13.9.3 Increased National Saving
Perhaps the most important economic eﬀect of a pension reform pro-
gram like that of Romania is its eﬀect on national saving. It is well known
that the eﬀect on national saving of a switch—partial or total—from a
PAYGO, DB system to a private, funded DC system depends on how the
change is ﬁnanced. If it is completely deﬁcit ﬁnanced, the introduction of
the funded system has no eﬀect on national saving because the additional
saving going into the private system is oﬀset by additional dissaving in
the state budget. We have shown above that, in the Romanian case, the
transitional deﬁcit is fully ﬁnanced, after the ﬁrst three years, by saving
realized in the public system. It follows that, in our case, once the ﬁrst
three years have passed, mandatory, national saving is increased by the full
amount of ﬂows into the private funds.18
Of course, mandatory saving may not increase total national saving if
individuals ﬁnd ways to oﬀset it against other voluntary saving. One may
speculate about the size of this “crowding-out” eﬀect, but presumably it
is quite small in a transition economy such as that of Romania, where
opportunities to accumulate capital and information about them are lim-
ited for a substantial part of the population.
According to the simulation reported in table 13.3, the capital stock
accumulated in the funded system is about 70 percent of GDP after forty
years. Using standard calculations of the contribution of capital and labor
18. We have seen in the Hamayon simulations that the combination of public and private
reform generates a surplus in the state’s social security fund. If that surplus is allowed to
accumulate, it constitutes additional national saving. We assume here that it is used to ﬁ-
nance future reductions in social security taxes.
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ment of a funded pension system in Romania will increase the growth rate
of output by almost one percent per year.19
13.10 Universal Pension Funds and the Capital Markets
A major concern regarding the implementation of a mandatory, fully
funded pension system in Romania is the ability of the system to provide
stable and adequate retirement beneﬁts to covered workers. Critics of the
pension reform have argued that because of the volatility of equity and
bond markets and the repeated episodes of high inﬂation, there is concern
that a catastrophic collapse of capital markets might wipe out the real
value of accumulated balances and leave retiring workers with inade-
quate income.
In response to this criticism it should ﬁrst be pointed out that the expo-
sure of retirees to market risk depends on the relative sizes of the ﬁrst
(public) and the second (private) pillars. Contributions to the ﬁrst pillar
are only weakly correlated with market returns, and the second pillar is
expected to provide at maturity 30–50 percent of total beneﬁts. Thus, the
multipillar structure tends to dilute the impact of market risks.
The experience from similar reforms around the world provides some
conﬁdence in the successful establishment of multipillar structures in
economies similar to Romania’s. After Chile’s abolition of the ﬁrst pillar
(1981), several Latin American countries implemented multipillar reforms:
Argentina (1994), Colombia (1994), Bolivia (1997), El Salvador (1998),
Mexico (1997), Peru (1993), and Uruguay (1996). More recently, several
transition economies—led by Hungary and Poland—have successfully im-
plemented mandatory, fully funded, privately managed pension funds
complementing a public, PAYGO ﬁrst pillar. Risks can be further reduced
by allowing investment abroad.
The introduction of a private second pillar in a country such as Romania
can be expected to have signiﬁcant positive externalities on capital mar-
kets. The establishment of an independent, pro active pension supervision
authority with wide jurisdiction should have, if properly implemented,
positive eﬀects on other existing regulatory agencies (e.g., in banking, in-
surance, and the stock market).
The establishment of privately managed pension funds can be expected
to lead to the entry of major global insurance ﬁrms and investment banks
into Romania, as was the experience in Poland. These ﬁrms have a reputa-
tion for following solid investment and auditing practices, which will posi-
tively aﬀect the practices of local ﬁrms.
19. See de Menil and Sheshinski (1998). This calculation assumes that there is no
crowding-out of voluntary private saving. Some of the issues addressed throughout section
13.9 are discussed in de Menil (2000).
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Throughout Eastern Europe, the collapse of communism revealed an
incipient crisis in the provision of social security. Actuarially unsound re-
tirement systems that were incapable of surviving in other than a com-
mand economy were threatened with collapse. Both the critical condition
of retirees and the burden of pension payments on state budgets made
fundamental changes in the existing PAYGO systems a priority for reform.
In a number of countries, a desire to balance the promises of a state redis-
tributive system with the potential beneﬁts of the growth of capital mar-
kets led to the design of mixed, multipillar systems with private, funded
components. The combination of the saving achieved through the tight-
ening of the public system and the impetus to capital markets of the intro-
duction from private pension funds was expected to raise growth and im-
prove economic eﬃciency.
Romania, the second largest country in the region, is poorer than its
neighbors, and has been slower to reform. Although its beneﬁts were less
(both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP) than elsewhere, its
pension system was equally as bankrupt. For the ﬁrst seven years after
1989, instead of tightening the provisions inherited from Ceausescu, suc-
cessive governments relaxed controls on beneﬁts and responded to the
melting-away of the contributor base by raising taxes. By 1996, the pension
system was in full crisis. The government formed by the parties that won
the elections at the end of that year made pension reform a priority. It
focused ﬁrst where the need was most critical: closing the deﬁcit by funda-
mentally restructuring the PAYGO system. After a three-year process of
debate and negotiations, Parliament passed a new law that scaled back
the present discounted value of the entitlements of existing workers by 43
percent, and legislated a 19 percent increase in the contributor base. Sev-
eral months later (November 2000), the government passed, by emergency
ordinance, legislation to create a mandatory, second-pillar system of pri-
vate, funded pensions. The government that emerged from the elections
later that month withdrew the emergency ordinance and set up a commis-
sion to review its pension reform strategy. At the present writing, it is un-
clear what the next step will be.
The second-pillar design imbedded in the emergency ordinance passed
in Romania in November 2000 is notable for some distinguishing charac-
teristics. For instance, the state guarantee that is built into the system is
extended to the individual beneﬁciary, not to the fund; thus it entails less
moral hazard.
The success and safety of any future system depend critically on a cen-
tral institution, the Pension Supervisory Commission. The authority and
eﬀectiveness of this independent, autonomous professional body, respon-
sible for licensing and regulating private fund managers, is decisive. If the
430 Georges de Menil and Eytan Sheshinskicommission succeeds in remaining above politics and enforces the pruden-
tial regulations imbedded in the law, private funds can increase future re-
tirement beneﬁts and enhance the liquidity, transparency, and safety of
Romanian capital markets.
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Comment on chapters 11, 12, and 13 John McHale
Over the last decade, reforming politicians in post-communist countries
have often said their goal is to “return to Europe,” meaning, I suppose,
that they wish to adopt the economic institutions and policies of the suc-
cessful countries to their west and eventually join the European Union
(EU). Reading these excellent papers on fundamental pension reform in
three post-communist countries, one cannot help but be struck by the fact
that in this area, all three are leapfrogging their established market-
economy neighbors. On this question, we are looking east to see what we
can learn.
With three countries and limited space, I will not try to comment in any
detail on the individual papers. Instead I will brieﬂy reﬂect on the informa-
tion given that helps answer three big questions: What did these countries
do in the area of pension reform? Will the reforms be to their overall bene-
ﬁt? and, How, politically, did they manage to implement the reforms?
Although there are important diﬀerences in the details, it is striking that
each of the three countries has adopted or plans to adopt a version of the
three-pillared retirement income system that has been advocated by the
World Bank. The ﬁrst pillar is a restructured pay-as-you-go (PAYGO),
deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension, with substantially reduced costs and tighter
links between contributions and beneﬁts. The second pillar is based on the
diversion of a portion of contributions to individual investment accounts.
The third pillar is voluntary (tax-favored) saving. Not surprisingly, it is the
second, Chilean-style pillar that is receiving the most attention, because it
involves the most radical break with the past. Although it involves only
part of the total mandatory contributions, the shares of covered wages
ﬂowing into the second pillar are (or will be) signiﬁcant: 7.3 percent in
Poland, 6–8 percent in Hungary, and a planned 10 percent in Romania.
It is worth emphasizing that changes to the ﬁrst pillar have also been
John McHale is associate professor of economics at Harvard University.
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less like taxes by strengthening the links between contributions and bene-
ﬁts. Poland appears to have gone the farthest along this dimension, adopt-
ing a Swedish-style notional deﬁned contribution (NDC) system (but with-
out a ﬂexible retirement age). The Hungarian reforms “gradually eliminate
some of the redistributive elements in the formula,” although the details
are not spelled out in chapter 12. Finally, Romania (chap. 13) has moved
to a German-style points system, in which “workers accumulate points for
each full year worked at the average wage,” instead of a system with a
beneﬁt based on the best ﬁve earning years in the ten years prior to re-
tirement.
Will the reforms make these countries better oﬀ? The answer to this
question depends, of course, on complex judgments about equity between
and within generations; but it is helpful to look for evidence provided in
these papers on two important sub-questions: Will the reforms increase
economic eﬃciency? and, How will the reforms aﬀect retirement income
security?
Reforms to the ﬁrst and second pillars are likely to have a signiﬁcant
impact on labor market distortions. Exceptionally high labor tax rates,1
weak links between taxes and beneﬁts, low average returns on PAYGO
contributions, and extensive opportunities for (low-productivity) informal-
sector work, all indicate that the distortions created by the old system were
large. Working-age labor supply was distorted, unemployment rates were
pushed up by large tax wedges and high net replacement rates,2 and there
was a strong bias toward early retirement. Elementary economics suggests
that, given the initial conditions, even modest reforms should lead to large
eﬃciency improvements.
The impact of second-pillar reforms on capital market distortions is less
obvious. A reasonable starting assumption is that national saving is in-
eﬃciently low (say, because of capital income taxation), so that a second-
pillar induced increase in saving will lead to a net gain. In other words, the
decreased consumption today is more than oﬀset in present value terms by
the increase in output (and thus consumption) in the future. However, will
adding a funded pillar actually increase saving? The well-known problem
is that the diversion of contributions to individual accounts leaves a reve-
nue shortfall for funding the pensions of the presently retired. If this short-
fall is made up by domestic borrowing, then saving will not increase.
The direct impact on saving of diverting contributions to the second
pillar is considered most explicitly in the papers on Hungary and Roma-
1. Just prior to the reforms, contributions to the pension system alone accounted for 45.0
percent of covered wages in Poland, 33.0 percent in Hungary, and 37.5 percent in Romania
(having risen from 28.5 percent in January 1999).
2. The three countries had similar unemployment rates in 1998: 10.4 percent in Poland,
9.1 percent in Hungary, and 10.3 percent in Romania.
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the early increase in the PAYGO deﬁcit is about 0.8 percent of gross do-
mestic product (GDP), which is quite low given that 50 percent of the
labor force are diverting 6 percent of covered wages. Rocha and Vittas
provide simulation information on the net (direct) impact of the combined
reforms on saving over time, adding together the deﬁcit in the ﬁrst pillar
and the increased net saving in the second pillar; this reaches about 2
percent by the end of the decade. This is not quite the right calculation,
however, because what matters for the impact on saving is the increase in
the ﬁrst-pillar deﬁcit, not its absolute size.
The Romanian case is interesting in that the previous PAYGO system
cuts are suﬃciently large, and that the overall balance is projected to be
in surplus by 2004. Again we must ask if this is the right number to exam-
ine. Without a diversion to the second pillar, the PAYGO pillar would turn
to surplus even earlier. On the other hand, large cuts to ﬁrst-pillar spend-
ing might not have been feasible without the promise to introduce a sec-
ond pillar.
The Polish solution to transitional funding is to use privatization reve-
nues. It must be remembered, however, that those privatization revenues
could have been used to bring down the budget deﬁcit and boost national
saving directly. There is (to use the jargon) an opportunity cost to using
privatization revenues to cover the transition. Thus privatization revenues,
although politically useful in ﬁlling the gap, do not remove the need to
raise taxes or cut spending if saving is to rise over the transition relative
to the no-reform benchmark.3
A second, often-discussed (but diﬃcult to quantify) beneﬁt of introduc-
ing a funded pillar is that it will spur the development of capital markets,
in part because it forces the government to establish carefully a system of
prudential regulation for ﬁnancial intermediaries. A more well-developed
ﬁnancial system should increase saving by raising expected return,4 lead
toabetterallocationofcapital,andreducethevulnerabilityoftheeconomy
to domestic-banking and foreign-funding shocks. This eﬀect is probably
quite important for countries in which ﬁnancial markets are poorly devel-
oped, a category that surely includes all of the post-communist economies.
There is a danger, however, that the political perception of governmental
responsibility for the performance of the funded pillar that it created—
and the fact the government is oﬀering limited investment return guaran-
tees—will lead to an overly heavy regulatory hand. As described in the
3. From a national-saving point of view, a free giveaway of ownership stakes in former state
enterprises would be even worse, because recipients will probably raise their consumption in
response to this windfall.
4. More developed ﬁnancial markets can also reduce saving if they reduce liquidity con-
straints by making it easier to borrow.
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not self-evident that all the induced regulation will be for the best.
Next, I turn to the impact of reform on the security of retirement in-
come. Overall, my judgment is that the multipillared system does make
retirement income more secure—there is “security in diversity.” Of course,
the diversion of contributions to the second pillar exposes workers to in-
vestment risk and charges, which eat into returns. Against that, however,
must be weighed the very high political risk in the unreformed PAYGO
systems: that is, the risk that the parameters of the retirement beneﬁt and
contribution formulas will be altered by politicians. Even the limited re-
forms to beneﬁt formulas pursued thus far by the major industrial econo-
mies have usually had quite large impacts on the present value of an aver-
age worker’s expected stream of beneﬁts. The risk of beneﬁt cuts is high
when current beneﬁts are costly, when the system is in deﬁcit, and when
demographic trends will raise the overall cost (and deﬁcit) under existing
rules. As outlined in the three papers, the old systems have faced all these
problems to varying degrees. On balance, then, the diversiﬁcation advan-
tages provided by the multisource provision of retirement income, espe-
cially when combined with sensible regulation and limited guarantees for
the funded pillar, should allow workers to look forward to more secure re-
tirements.
This brings me to the last of the three questions: How were these coun-
tries able to push through such radical reforms? Although politics of re-
form diﬀered among the three countries, it seems that the perception of
political risk under the old system was a common element. Workers simply
did not believe that they would receive the beneﬁts that were being prom-
ised under the old DB rules. During the 1990s, they saw how beneﬁt for-
mulas could be made more austere through formula changes and limited
inﬂation protection—dramatically so in Romania. This made them re-
ceptive to alternatives, especially when the alternatives involved having
the concrete ownership of individual accounts that would be diﬃcult for
politicians to take away. The perception of political risk was suﬃciently
high that it allowed reformers to overcome the usual obstacles of the tran-
sition cost and the distributional churning of fundamental reform. (The
refusal of the new government in Hungary to follow through with the
planned increase in the contribution to the second pillar is a reminder,
however, that political risk is not entirely absent in a funded system,
either.)
A remarkable feature of the reforms in Hungary and Poland is that par-
ticipation in the funded pillar was voluntary for large sections of the popu-
lation. Essentially, workers are oﬀered a type of asset swap: They can ex-
change part of their eligibility in the DB system for the right to divert part
of their contributions to the funded pillar. By appropriately choosing the
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return in an investment-based system and of any perceptions of political
risk. In Hungary, for example, switching leads to the loss of approximately
one-fourth of already acquired rights. Nevertheless, half the Hungarian
labor force has made the switch. (In Poland, 10.5 million of the eligible 11.5
million have switched). Voluntary diversion also allows the government to
take advantage of a free rider problem for those being oﬀered the opt-out.
The lost revenues to the PAYGO system by the diversions will probably
have to be made up by tax increases or spending cuts, which will hurt
current working generations. The burden of these ﬁscal adjustments will
fall broadly, however, landing on both those who do and those who do not
take the partial opt-out. Thus, members of the transition generations
might be collectively disadvantaged by the asset swap, but still ﬁnd it indi-
vidually advantageous to accept.
What do the accounts of fundamental reform in these countries tell us
about the probability of similar reforms in Western Europe? Encourag-
ingly for advocates of reform, the stories told in these papers show that it
is possible to have radical change even when there is a large implicit pen-
sion debt. The Polish and Hungarian cases, in particular, show how reform
can come through voluntary choice rather than through politically diﬃcult
beneﬁt cutting. In each of the three countries, however, the present value
of expected accrued beneﬁts based on past contributions was probably
much less than the face value of the implicit debt. Ironically, reform in
Western Europe is made more diﬃcult by the greater credibility of its pen-
sion promises.
Discussion Summary for Chapters 11, 12, and 13
Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ commented on the reform proposal for Romania. He
criticized the notion that a country may develop by mobilizing domestic
saving to invest, because all the countries that have developed quickly—
such as Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, or more recently, China—have done
so with massive amounts of foreign investments. In his view, the Romani-
ans will end up investing in government debt because there are no domes-
tic alternatives to invest. The government will use that borrowing to spend
more and in the end will be unable to repay the debt. Eytan Sheshinski
responded by noting that 90 percent of China’s investments are ﬁnanced
by local saving and that China has done reasonably well with that. Shes-
hinski said that, in general, there is a trade-oﬀ between the tightness of
regulations and the degree of competition in the pension system. He re-
ported that when the Romanians had to weigh the security of the new
436 Georges de Menil and Eytan Sheshinskisystem against the degree of competition, they adhered to the cautious
side. He noted that the support for moving to a funded system is very
fragile in Romania, and a fund’s going under once or twice could be disas-
trous for the whole system. As examples of the cautious approach taken
in Romania, Sheshinski mentioned fee regulations, regulations with re-
spect to the portfolio structure, and pension guarantees.
Axel Bo ¨rsch-Supan asked about the assumptions made in the paper by
Rocha and Vittas with respect to the crowding out of savings. Roberto
Rocha answered that the paper does not contain estimates for overall pri-
vate savings, but only for pension savings. The total eﬀect of the pension
reform on voluntary private saving is unclear in the view of Rocha, because
diﬀerent reform parameters have contradictory inﬂuences on private
saving.
Bo ¨rsch-Supan noted that a conversion to a notional deﬁned contribu-
tion (NDC) plan does not change the economics of the pension system.
Rocha responded that Hungary did not undertake an NDC reform but a
deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) reform. He said that the simulations of NDC reforms
in the paper are counterfactual, because they show what the eﬀects of an
NDC reform would have been. With respect to the growth eﬀects of pen-
sions, Rocha called the literature on growth schizophrenic: The empirical
literature on growth shows a powerful and robust capital market eﬀect on
growth, whereas in the pensions and growth literature this eﬀect does not
exist. Ignazio Visco remarked that the capital market eﬀects quoted by
Rocha may depend on some extreme observations.
Referring to the paper by de Menil and Sheshinski, Axel Bo ¨rsch-Supan
asked how the surplus that accrues to the government in a pay-as-you-go
system is transferred to private accounts. Eytan Sheshinski answered that
the collection of contributions is performed by the public system for rea-
sons of returns to scale. The diversion to the private funds is performed
through the government on the basis of membership. Sheshinski called
this the most eﬃcient and secure method of collecting and distributing the
contributions. Bo ¨rsch-Supan expressed his opinion that the important goal
is not to increase saving but to increase capital productivity.
Sheshinski noted that the terms concerning the annuitization of the pen-
sion funds have not been determined yet in the transition economies. He
called this a real weakness of the reforms in these countries. Sheshinski
ﬁnally emphasized that the structure of the regulatory authority is of ut-
most importance for the success of the reforms. For Romania the decision
was to establish a new regulatory authority detached as much as possible
from the political arm.
Roberto Rocha noted that the ﬁrst pillar that has been introduced in the
central and eastern European countries is not the ﬁrst pillar the World
Bank has advocated. The World Bank has advocated a redistributive ﬁrst
pillar, whereas the ﬁrst pillar in the central and eastern European countries
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sion system. Regarding the question of the discussant as to why the transi-
tion numbers for Hungary look reasonable, Rocha mentioned the erosion
of the tax base that preceded the reform. If a country had already suﬀered
a massive erosion of the tax base before a reform, the revenue losses from
the introduction of a second pillar after the reform are much smaller.
Jerzy Hausner said that even if one cannot prove that a pension reform
will raise domestic saving, one advantage is obvious: A pension reform will
change the proportions in the capital market, because domestic long-term
capital could not be created in any other way.
438 Georges de Menil and Eytan Sheshinski